In the Email Game (Rubinstein, AER 89) noisy information channels may prevent efficient coordination, even when the game is almost common knowledge. In the paper we show that this is the case whenever message failure probabilities are not sufficiently different. Quite intuitively, the extent of the difference is governed by the game payoffs, and in particular by the purely mixed Nash equilibrium strategy of one of the two coordination games to be played. This is because, conditional to having observed one's type, a player's beliefs on the opponent's choices are governed by the reliability of communication channels.
Introduction
In a fascinating paper Rubinstein (1989) investigated the consequence of a condition of almost common knowledge in the Electronic Mail Game (EMG) that two individuals are playing.
The EMG is a Bayesian game where players are differently informed on the relevant strategic form coordination game, which is chosen by nature out of two possible ones. The depth (degree) of almost common knowledge concerning the game that is being played is governed by a conceived as the final outcome of some learning process. Indeed, subjects involved in this very same strategic situation for a sufficiently high number of repetitions eventually exhibited choices consistent with Rubinstein's equilibrium.
From the point of view of possible real life applications of the model, implemented to enhance efficient coordinated choices, the following consideration is unavoidable. If rational players consider setting up such device they should also anticipate that it would be pointless as it would entail the same choices of the no communication case. Hence a natural question to pose is whether or not the same communication protocol could in some way accommodate agents' coordination, and if yes how.
A first positive answer in this direction was provided by Rubinstein (1989) himself. Indeed in his work he shows how, operating on the technological side, a more intuitive outcome could arise. In particular he suggests that, under appropriate conditions, imposing a commonly known upper bound to the number of exchanged messages might induce two NE and, in one of them, informational exchange has a role in enhancing more appropriate coordination. Recent, independent, work by Binmore and Samuelson (2000) pointed out that if informational exchange is either voluntary, or else costly or both then efficient coordination could take place.
In this paper, departing in a minimal way from the original version of the EMG, we are interested in investigating the possibility of improved coordination within a very general communication-technology framework. As we shall see, this will allow us to identify a theoretical key point underlying Rubinstein's results. More specifically, as in Rubinstein the parameter ε, with 1≥ε≥0, represents the probability for both players' computers that an email message will fail reaching the other machine, we shall consider here the situation in which players may (possibly correctly) perceive computers to have different failure probabilities. It may be worth mentioning that such analysis was mainly motivated by the following two basic intuitions: in Rubinstein's framework no other NE, of the single games defining the EMG, plays a role and, for the result to obtain, no specific relationship is asked to hold between the communication-technology parameters and payoffs.
We shall see that the results provide a fully satisfactory answer to the above observations Indeed, roughly speaking, what we find is that informational exchange may possibly entail more desirable coordination if and only if i) for one of the two individuals, the probability of a successful message is greater than the purely mixed strategy equilibrium probability, in one of the two games defining EMG, of the more rewarding-risky action and ii) the opponent has a "sufficiently less reliable" computer in sending messages.
Nonetheless, even in this more general context, uniqueness of the NE found by Rubinstein is still pervasive in terms of probability values; what we are now capable of however is to put it into a broad perspective that allows us to understand its nature. More specifically, uniqueness in Rubinstein could be interpreted as a particular manifestation (when message failure probabilities are equal) of a more general phenomenon that obtains within a well defined subset of the space of message failure probabilities, given by the unit square. Outside the above subset there could be multiple equilibria, including that in which players coordinate "almost perfectly"
(namely with the exception of just one state of the world) on the Pareto efficient NE, regardless of the game chosen by nature.
The results appear also to suggest that a relevant notion of almost common knowledge, needed for proper coordination, may not be so much one related to the number of messages exchanged by players but rather a notion linked to the closeness of message error probabilities to their values characterising common knowledge of the game played. Alternatively, what seems to matter is not so much the depth of the beliefs hierarchy concerning the game but rather beliefs about actions taken by the opponent. As these are supported by the reliability of communication channels our findings are not surprising. Moreover, this view might also be corroborated by "payoff continuity" considerations. More specifically, both players' expected payoff associated to the equilibrium strategy profile where, at all types, agents choose actions as in the efficient equilibrium with common knowledge converge to this last equilibrium expected payoff when the relevant message failure probability tends to the value entailing common knowledge of the game.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we define the Generalised Electronic Mail Game, formulate necessary and sufficient conditions for uniqueness (multiplicity) of Nash Equilibria, discuss ex-ante efficiency, argue that the notion of almost common knowledge could be related to message failure probabilities rather than to the number of exchanged messages and provide an alternative interpretation for the model and results. Section 3 concludes the paper.
The Generalised Electronic Mail Game (GEMG)

The Game
We refer to the version of the EMG appearing in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) , where two individuals (I and II) have to play one of the two coordination games depicted in Fig. 1 below
States of nature a and b are the only two possible ones; depending upon the state one of the two games will be played. It will either be Game a (G a ), with probability 1-p, or Game b (G b ) with probability p. Notice that while G a has only one (pure strategy) NE, the profile (A,A) Rubinstein's EMG the message has probability 1>ε>0 of failing to reach the other machine. If the first message arrives then C II will automatically reply by sending a confirmation message with the same probability 1>ε>0 of not getting through. If C I receives this message it will in turn send a confirmation (of a confirmation) message, still with 1>ε>0 failure probability and so on. To simplify notation, from now on a strategy in the game will be written as
where I(t i =t) is the standard indicator function. So, for example δ i =I(t i =0) is the strategy for player i specifying to play A at type (t i =0) and B at all other types.
According to Rubinstein, with probability one the game played will not be common knowledge; nonetheless, it could be of almost common knowledge should the number of messages appearing on the screens be sufficiently high.
Nash Equilibria and Communication Technology
We start by recalling Rubinstein's main result; below, 0<ε I ,ε II <1 1 indicate (respectively) the failure message probabilities of C I and C II . From now on we shall refer to the EMG, where ε I and ε II may possibly differ, as the Generalised Electronic Mail Game (GEMG). However, before stating the first proposition it is worth pointing out explicitly that the following assumption holds (in an informal way) throughout the paper.
Assumption The probabilities 0≤ε I (t),ε II (t)≤1 are common knowledge between players.
We shall see below that since in Rubinstein probabilities are equal their value does not play any role in the main result: due to this, no assumption like the above one would be needed in that particular case. However, as we hinted at in the introduction, if players are interested in efficient coordination then they should make sure to agree on probabilities being sufficiently different.
Proposition 1 (Osborne-Rubinstein, 1994) hold; hence it is optimal for I to choose δ I (1)***=1. ii) At any t I >1 playing B is optimal for I against II choosing δ**. Take now player II. By a reasoning analogous to that of point (1) it can be easily verified that at t II ≥1 action B is best reply for II against I playing δ*** and the proof is complete.
When conditions in point (1) of the above proposition hold it is ε II >ε I ; viceversa when those in point (2) are true. Namely improved coordination can only obtain if the message failure probability of C I is sufficiently different from that of C II . Is not enough that one machine is highly reliable; what is also needed is that the other should be relatively less so. Discussion on why this has to be the case will be postponed until Corollary 2 below. A consequence of the finding could be that, for more desirable coordination to be achieved, mutual knowledge of the game might suffice; in any case, the common knowledge efficient outcome can never be achievable. A with probability z or B with probability (1-z). More explicitly, from the point of view of I it is as if II, in G b , is playing the purely mixed strategy (z,1-z) with the, obvious, interpretational proviso that z is a technological, rather than behavioural, parameter 2 . Hence, playing B is strictly optimal for I if and only if the "mixed strategy" z is no greater than the NE purely mixed strategy of choosing A, namely q. Analogous considerations would hold for point (2). If ε I =ε II then z=1/(2-ε)=z'>1/2 and the above requisites are never satisfied. Rubinstein hints at this last point as the crucial one in the EMG inducing coordination failure at game G b . As q<1/2, the analysis pursued indicates that 1-z>1/2 (1-z'>1/2) is certainly a necessary however not sufficient condition for (δ**,δ**) ( (δ***,δ**)) to be an equilibrium in the GEMG; indeed, it has to be that (1-
Below we see that these conditions are in fact much more meaningful; in particular, they provide a full characterisation for the pair (δ*,δ*) to be the unique NE of the GEMG.
Proposition 3 The pair (δ*,δ*) is the unique NE of the GEMG if and only if z>q and z'>q.
Proof Immediate. Indeed, as for sufficiency, let t I *≥1 and t II *≥1 be the lowest types such that, respectively, δ I (t I *)<1 and δ II (t II *)<1 at a NE. Then it is either t I *-1=t II * or t I *=t II *. In both cases, by a reasoning analogous to that in the proof of Proposition 2 it is easy to see that either z≤q or z'≤q.
Assume instead z>q and z'>q; then it is also simple to check that no NE can accommodate players choosing B with strictly positive probability at some type. Before discussing efficiency it may be interesting to identify the unique NE with purely mixed strategies, at all t I ,t II ≥1 , for both players. 
Proposition 4 The pair of strategies δ I =δ'=I(t I =0)+Σ t≥1 qI(t I =t) and δ II =δ''= I(t II =0)+Σ t≥1 δ II (t)I(t II =t), where δ II (t)=-δ II (t-1)z/(1-z)+q/(1-z), is a Nash Equilibrium of the GEMG if and only if
, with δ I (1)∈(0,1) . Hence, the pair (δ', δ'') is an equilibrium. Necessity is evident.
In the above result notice that as z<1/2 it is z/(1-z)<1 so that for large enough t strategy δ II (t) approximates q, the purely mixed strategy equilibrium of the stage game G b . Instead, since z'>1/2 it is z'/(1-z')>1 so that as t gets large δ I (t) would diverge from q unless it was equal to it for all t=1,2,… To conclude, not counter intuitively, when an equilibrium with purely mixed strategies at all non zero types obtains, as t gets large it tends to coincide with the purely mixed strategy equilibrium of G b .
Ex-Ante Efficiency
As under the conditions of Proposition 2 the GEMG has multiple equilibria it is interesting to briefly investigate their ex-ante efficiency. We shall do so, on the one hand, by comparing players' expected payoffs at (δ*,δ*) with that of alternative equilibria and, on the other hand, by discussing possible rankings of equilibria based on their efficiency.
As far as the first point is concerned it appears worth dwelling shortly on the matter since, in principle, is not obvious that (δ*,δ*) would be ex-ante Pareto inferior to equilibria with coordination on B at some non zero type. For example, to be more explicit, (δ**,δ**) induces efficient coordination at all states except state (1,0) where, in G b , player II chooses A and I chooses B getting the lowest stage game payoff of -L. Coordination failure at that state could, in a sense, be interpreted as a price paid by I to enhance coordination when the number of exchanged messages is higher. As player I would obtain -L with probability pε I , intuitively she may be willing to bear the risk of losses at state (1,0) only if ε I is sufficiently low. If (δ**,δ**)
could at all be Pareto superior to (δ*,δ*) this would likely happen under a similar condition.
Below we show that this is indeed true and that, moreover, the upper bound q for ε I suffices.
Proposition 5 If (δ**,δ**) and (δ***,δ**) are NE of the GEMG then (δ*,δ*) is not ex-ante Pareto optimal.
Proof Immediate. Let EΠ i (δ I , δ II ) be player's i expected payoff when players choose, respectively, δ I and δ II . Then,
It is easy to see that EΠ I (δ**, δ**)> EΠ I (δ*, δ*) if and only if ε I <M/(L+M). By the same reasoning it is simple to check that EΠ II (δ**, δ**)>EΠ II (δ*, δ*) for all 0<ε I ,ε II <1; as M/(M+L)>q the result follows. Similar considerations hold when comparing (δ***, δ**) with (δ*, δ*).
The above proposition simply says that reaching an ex-ante (self-sustaining) agreement on both of them playing B, even when a minimal number of messages is exchanged (according to the definition of δ** and δ***), is always beneficial to the players. Clearly, (δ**,δ**)
would be preferable for II and (δ***,δ**) for I. It is simple to see that equilibria, induced by the conditions of Proposition 2 and in which agents wait for a higher number of messages before coordinating on B, are clearly less preferred to either (δ**,δ**) or (δ***,δ**), by at least one player.
Hence, in so far as efficiency is concerned, there appear to be a natural ranking suggesting players to coordinate on a minimal number on messages sent, depending upon the relative machines reliability. This is what observation on how people appear to interact in reality seems to suggest; based on this the consideration could be forwarded that efficiency may be an explicit or implicit criterion used by agents in order to select among mulyiple equilibria. To the extent that failure message probabilities allow so, players' coordination on B achieved by economising on the number of messages exchanged is simply more ex-ante efficient.
Type-Dependent Technology
Let us now consider the very general case where
message error probability at its tth message. The uniqueness result can now be generalised, in full analogy with Proposition 3, as follows.
Proposition 6 The pair (δ*,δ*) is the unique NE of the GEMG if and only if min t≥1 z(t)>q and min t≥1 z'(t)>q where z(t)=ε I (t)/[ε I (t)+ε II (t)(1-ε I (t))] and z'(t)=ε II (t)/[ε II (t)+ε I (t+1)(1-ε II (t))].
Almost Common Knowledge
The analysis conducted so far may suggest a possible alternative view of almost common knowledge (ack) with respect to the one proposed by Rubinstein. Indeed, as in the EMG common knowledge arises when ε I =ε=ε II =0, it could be argued that the relevant notion of ack should somehow refer to the values of ε I and ε II rather than to the number of messages delivered. Alternatively, in some sense, may privilege quality of the transmitted information rather than quantity, or else concern actions and not the length of beliefs hierarchy of the game.
In order to articulate more on the issue consider the connection between information partitions and common knowledge in some relevant extreme instances. It has been noticed (Binmore and Samuelson, 2000) that in ordinary, every day life, conversations individuals may frequently agree on joint course of actions using just two messages; typically, the first would communicate coordination terms while the second simply confirms that the first message was understood. On the basis of the above considerations this could be justified in more than one way. For example, it may not be common knowledge that the first message gets successfully through (even if it does), while success of confirmation message is common knowledge. Alternatively, it may be common knowledge that the first message has positive failure probability while it is common knowledge that confirmation goes through successfully. In both instances we would interpret coordinated actions undertaken by players as being common knowledge.
The following two could be taken as further arguments in support of the view that we proposed on ack .
(Threshold for ack) While the notion based upon messages would leave undetermined the number of exchanged messages needed to speak of ack, that founded on message error probabilities may instead identify a critical value below which ack of G b could be triggered.
More specifically, the alleged threshold could be represented by q as it provides, either to ε I or ε II , the (necessary) upper bound for efficient coordination to obtain.
(Payoff Continuity) It is simple to see that EΠ II (δ**, δ**) = M -pε I (M-1) which, as well as EΠ I (δ**, δ**) is independent of ε II and tends to M when ε I tends to zero, the efficient equilibrium outcome with common knowledge of the game. In words, the payoffs associated to the equilibrium where, at all types, players choose as in the efficient equilibrium with common knowledge of the game, are continuous in ε I as it tends to the value entailing common knowledge of G b .
An Alternative Interpretation
Differences in message failure probabilities could be justified by introducing interpretative elements alternative to those in Rubinstein's model, in so far as how the informational exchange would take place between the two players. As well as in BinmoreSamuelson (2000) , subjective aspects could be introduced in the framework together with objective elements (machine reliability). Consider the following simple example. Suppose it is common knowledge that i) 0<ε<1 is both players' machine message failure probability and ii) machines do not reply automatically to messages received rather players decide, every time they receive a message, whether to do so or not. In particular, (say) player I replies to every message she receives (included that from nature) with probability one while II answers only with probability 0<λ<1, independently of machines failure probabilities. Hence, while ε I =ε remains the probability that II does not receive a message sent by I, the probability that I will not receive a message from II is now ε II = (1-λ)+λε which, given the assumptions, is strictly greater than ε I . In particular, if λ satisfies the inequality λ<[q-ε]/[(1-ε) 2 q] , and moreover ε<q, then conditions of point (1) in Proposition 2 will be met entailing multiple equilibria. In other words, the symmetry assumption of machine reliability could be retained, for instance in absence of discriminatory elements, and yet multiplicity could arise as a result of sufficiently different personal attitudes towards answering messages.
